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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the perception of autonomy of the agencies on the federal level in Austria 
and Switzerland. The study shows there is a high correlation between the legal form and the 
perceived autonomy. A reason may be the deeply-rooted law tradition of the two countries. 
Differences between Switzerland and Austria are rare. The only strong correlation is the higher 
financial autonomy the Swiss agencies have possibly due to the stable financial situation of 
Swiss administration and the focus on financial reforms. The two countries can be considered as 
twins of the Alps. 
 
Introduction 
Switzerland and Austria, two countries in the Alps, have many comparable characteristics: they 
are both of the same size (CH: 7.8 million residents vs. AT: 8.3 million residents), are federal 
structured, and their political-administrative system is founded on the deeply-rooted law 
tradition (Rechtsstaat). The common language of German allows an easy transfer of knowledge 
between these two neutral and wealthy countries.  
During the last twenty years, the governments of the two countries emphasized the significance 
of a more managerial and outcome-oriented steering which led to a country-specific 
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introduction of the globally observed New Public Management phenomenon. One of the key 
elements of this concept is giving more freedom to the organizational units and making them 
more responsible for their performance  (Lienhard 2005, Hammerschmid 1998).   
This paper aims to analyze the degree of freedom which has been given to the organizational 
units on the federal level and if one can observe any differences between the two countries. 
Although Austria and Switzerland may be seen as twins on the first sight, differences in the 
structure of the countries can be observed after a profound analysis. This may have an effect on 
autonomy.  
The paper starts with a definition of the process which led to the higher degree of freedom and 
how this additional freedom – we call it autonomy – can be measured. From this starting point 
we develop hypotheses which are being grounded. After the development of the methodology 
the results are being presented and discussed.  
 
Agencification in Austria and Switzerland 
During the last two decades, many governments around the world increased the autonomy of 
their organizational units. This development can be described as an agencification process or 
even as an agencification fever (Pollitt 2004). The agencification process has often been part of 
introducing a set of steering philosophies and instruments which can be described as New 
Public Management.   
According to Talbot (2004: 6) this process is characterized by the following elements:  
 “Structural disaggregation and/or the creation of „task specific“ organizations 
 Performance “contracting” – some form of performance target setting, monitoring and 
reporting 
 Deregulation (or more properly reregulation) of controls over personnel, finance and other 
management matters.” 
When applying the agency idea to the administrative structures of Austria and Switzerland, one 
has to notice that both countries are characterized by a strong Napoleonic or hierarchical 
bureaucracy tradition. Swiss and Austrian administrations historically have an organizational 
structure consisting of ministries which direct departmental units. These departmental units not 
only formulate policies, but also implement and evaluate them on behalf of the ministries. Final 
decisions are usually made by the ministries.  
The agencification process in the two countries has led to new steering concepts and new legal 
forms but is still closely based upon the Napoleonic bureaucracy model as it can be expected 
from a path-dependent viewpoint (Peters 2008). We can differ between four main types of 
organizational units we find these days in the two countries: 
 The first, innermost circle comprises all organizations, which are responsible for the 
coordination and steering of the administration. Those activities can either be directed 
towards the administration (general secretariats, cross sectional offices) or towards the 
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public (foremost offices that grant subsidies). In any case those entities are supposed to be 
tightly led by the federal government. 
 In the second circle, we find those offices that are led by performance contracts and global 
budgeting. Thus they enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than organizations within the first 
circle but still belong to the hierarchical structure of public administration (Programm FLAG 
2006).  
 The third circle is composed of public law bodies. They are fully government owned but are 
legally independent and have their own management directorate. Further every public law 
body has an oversight board, which also links up the administration with the organization 
(the government sends its representatives only to the board and not to the directorate). The 
respective areas of autonomy and responsibilities are formally defined in an organizational 
decree.   
 In the fourth circle all state owned enterprises can be found. They have the special legal 
form of a public or private corporation - meaning basically that a minority of its shares are 
traded on the stock market, whereas the country keeps the majority of those shares. 
Similarly to the third circle these organizations have an oversight board, where the 
government can send delegates to. Another sort of organizations within this circle are all 
private law organizations that fulfill public tasks (mostly foundations). This may have 
different reasons. Either explicit independence from the government is required (e.g. 
research institutes) or a cooperation with private actors is possible (e.g. export/import 
promotion organizations) (Bundesrat 2006, Schmalhardt 2005). 
Using the Talbot definition of an agency, circles two to four can be considered as agencies. 
 
Autonomy as a Key-Element of Agencification 
A key-element of agencification is the extended degree of autonomy which is being given to the 
organizational units. It is important to understand that autonomy is not a univariate dimension. 
Because the interaction between (partly)-autonomous units and their mother institutions is 
complex and diverse, we must differentiate between different aspects of autonomy 
(Christensen & Laegreid 2006). 
This paper differentiates between three autonomy dimensions (Verhoest et al. 2010):  
Human resource (HR) autonomy: Human resource autonomy can be understood as the degree 
to which extent an agency can decide upon its human resource matters without interference 
from the superior government levels. One can differentiate between operational and strategic 
human resource autonomy. Operational HR autonomy focuses on the decision making 
competences an agency has on an individual level. This includes aspects as the ability to 
formulate job descriptions, to fix the salary levels, to hire and dismiss employees. Strategic HR 
autonomy can be described as the competences an agency has for its whole staff. In most of the 
cases this includes that the agency has its own HR department/section, by which the agency can 
set up its own processes for employment, payment, training and dismissal (Laegreid 2007). High 
levels of HR autonomy may be seen as an advantage for agencies as it allows managers to 
closely adjust the HR polices to their specific needs (Verhoest et al. 2010): e. g. individual salary 
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settings or training opportunities can position the agency as an attractive employer and reward 
performance.  
Financial Autonomy: With financial autonomy this study understands the level of decision 
making competencies an agency has towards its financial resources. The logic behind shifting 
financial competences from the core government to its decentralized units is, like for the HR 
autonomy, derived from a management oriented view. Agencies that can decide by themselves 
on how to use their financial means are supposed to work more efficiently. As with the financial 
authority also the responsibility is given to the agency management, it is also responsible for its 
resources, and can therefore be charged for financial mismanagement. This sets incentives for 
using the available money economically (Schick 2001). In this study the agency’s financial 
autonomy is measured by for different factors: The ability to make investments or large 
procurements independently from intervention above, the possibility to take loans for further 
investments, the option to set prices for its products and services on its own and being able to 
shift resources within the budget (e.g. from personnel to operating costs) and from the actual 
budget to the next years financial period. 
Policy Autonomy: Similarly to HR autonomy and financial autonomy, policy autonomy describes 
a level of decision making competencies an agency has, this time referring to the specific tasks 
of an agency (Verschuere 2006). In a classical bureaucratic structure, a parliament would fix the 
general tasks of the government by laws and regulations. The government would then define 
the precise requirements for the task fulfillment for each organization and the organization 
itself would only decide on technical or operational issues. - What might be a purely technical 
issue for an agency can be of high political relevance (one might think of closing branch offices 
of the postal services and therefore cutting jobs in remote areas).   
 
Hypotheses 
This paper is testing three hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The legal form of an organizational unit is an important predictor for the degree 
of autonomy. 
Austria and Switzerland as deeply-rooted law tradition states are expected to fix the degree of 
autonomy they give to their organizational units by law. We can expect that there is a high 
correlation between the legal form of the units and their autonomy. This correlation has also 
been detected in other country studies but some of them pretend that the legal form is only 
one aspect of many which influence autonomy (Bach et al. 2010, Fedele & Galli 2007, Gill 2005, 
Moe 2002). We expect a strong and highly significant correlation in Austria and Switzerland.  
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Hypothesis 2: The Swiss organizational units have more autonomy than their Austrian 
counterparts. 
Switzerland has been more in favor for management concepts in the past. The members of 
parliament only serve as part-time politicians; most of them have a regular job in the private 
sector. Therefore, private sector concepts easily enter public administration. We can expect that 
the agencification process is in line with this thinking and Swiss agencies are being given a 
higher degree of freedom than in Austria. The financial stability of the Swiss government may 
also support the hypothesis. Because the financial debts have been lower and the budgets are 
more balanced than in Austria, Swiss government is not in need of a tight steering of agencies.    
There is also an argument which argues against this hypothesis. Switzerland has only few 
ministries which have to control many organizational units, whereas Austria has many ministries 
with few units. From a principal agent point of view we can expect that Switzerland will give less 
autonomy to their units because they try to keep control of their agents and standardize the co-
ordination between them.   
A second argument is the more consequent delegation of power in Switzerland to the lower tier 
of government. Co-operative federalism in Switzerland means that national agencies mainly 
formulate policies, but service delivery often happens on the state level. In Austria, we have a 
broader range of activities the agencies perform on national level with direct contact to the 
citizens. Because service delivery may be seen as less critical than policy formulation from the 
viewpoint of a politician and because “standardized mass production” needs faster managerial 
decisions, Austria may give more autonomy to their agencies.  
 
Hypothesis 3:   Policy autonomy in Switzerland is significantly lower than in Austria. 
Swiss citizens can decide on almost all important policy issues through referenda and initiatives. 
This concept of direct democracy is not known in Austria, as it is not in any other country of the 
world to such an extent. The Swiss government is obliged to communicate actively its policy 
formulation and include all stakeholders continuously in the decision-making process in order to 
find solutions which get approval from the majority of the citizens. We can therefore expect 
that the Swiss government will be reluctant to give too much policy autonomy to its agencies 
but closely steer the political decision making process.  
 
Methodology 
For the analysis of autonomy the organizational units in the two countries have, we use a model 
with the three types of autonomy as the dependent variables and characteristics of agencies in 
the two countries as independent variables.  
 
Data Collection  
The data is being collected through a written survey on the basis of the COBRA questionnaire. 
This standard questionnaire has been adapted to the respective country contexts.  
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The Swiss and the Austrian survey were both conducted between June and November 2009 and 
were issued to the heads of the organizations. In the Swiss case 124 agencies received a 
questionnaire and 76.6% (N=95) of these organization responded. In the Austrian case 191 CEOs 
were addressed, of which 35.6% (N=68) responded to the questionnaire. Hence an overall of 
163 organizations are analyzed in this study. 
As noticed before the legal types of organizations in Austria and Switzerland are largely 
identical. Hence the agencies of both countries can be grouped into the same categories. These 
four categories, shown by table 1, are numbered according to their “distance” to the core 
government. Whereas the federal administrative bodies/federal offices are closest to the core 
and the funds and foundations are the most distant agencies. 
 
Category Description in Austria Description in 
Switzerland 
 Number of 
Agencies 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Number of 
Respondents 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Response 
rate (%) 
Austria 
Switzerland 
1 
federal administrative 
bodies (nachgeordnete 
Dienststellen, 
Bundesämter) 
federal offices 
(Bundesämter) 
 58 
50 
22 
36 
38% 
72 
2 
agencies operating under 
the Flexibilisierungs-
klausel (Flexi-Ämter) 
offices led by 
performance 
contract and global 
budget (FLAG-
Ämter) 
 18 
25 
11 
20 
61% 
80% 
3 
Corporations based on 
public law (Bundes-
organe, verwaltete 
Einrichtungen mit 
eigener Rechtspersön-
lichkeit) 
Public Law Bodies 
(Anstalten) 
 34 
18 
11 
17 
32% 
94% 
4a 
corporations based on 
private law (AG, GmbH, 
federation is the single 
largest owner) 
corporations 
(either private law 
or special public 
law) (AG, confede-
ration has majority 
of shares) 
 61 
6 
21 
4 
34% 
66% 
4b 
funds and foundations funds and 
foundations 
 20 
25 
3 
17 
20% 
68% 
Total Austria 
Total Switzerland 
191 
124 
68 
94 
35.6% 
75.8% 
Table 1: Public Organizations on Federal Level in Switzerland and Austria 
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Dependent Variables 
In order to construct policy autonomy, financial autonomy, and human resource autonomy, we 
use different items which measure aspects of these autonomy dimensions (table 2).  
 
Autonomy Dimension 
 
Items 
 
strategic HR autonomy (1a) Concerning strategic personnel management autonomy: Can the organization 
without interference from above / without ministerial or department influence set 
general policy for the organization (in the following areas of HRM management)? 
recruitment / salaries / evaluating personnel / promotion / downsizing 
(each measured on a 4-point scale) 
 
operative HRM autonomy 
(1b) 
Concerning operational personnel management autonomy: Can the organization 
without interference from above / without ministerial or department influence set 
operational policy for the organization (in the following areas of HRM 
management)? 
recruitment / salaries / evaluating personnel / promotion / downsizing 
(measured on a 4-point scale) 
 
financial management  
autonomy (2) 
 
Concerning financial management autonomy: Can the organization without 
interference from ministerial influence take budgetary decisions (in the following 
areas of financial management)? 
take loans for investments / set tariffs for dues and fees / set tariffs services and 
products / engage in participations in private law legal persons / shifts between 
budgets for running and personnel costs / shifts between budgets for running or 
personnel costs on the one hand and investments on the other hand / shift 
between the budgets of different years 
(measured on a 6-point scale) 
 
policy autonomy (3) How is the organization’s autonomy and fulfillment of tasks within the legal 
framework characterized regarding the following areas (the way tasks are 
implemented, exact prioritization of activities)? 
selection and limitation of target group / definition of instruments for 
implementation of tasks / characteristics of concrete implementation of tasks 
(measured on a 7-point scale) 
 
Table 2: Measurement of Autonomy Dimensions – Used Items in the Questionnaire 
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The questions in both surveys regarding the different dimensions of agency autonomy were 
largely similar, and both surveys used the same language which minimizes problems of 
translation and contextual adaptation. For strategic HR autonomy the Austrian questionnaire 
had one item (question) more that the Swiss version. As the other items were identical the 
additional Austrian item was excluded from the analysis. For policy autonomy the Austrian 
respondents had to fill in on a 7 point scale from: “Neither the organization nor the ministry can 
take decisions as the legal basis does not provide it” (no autonomy) until “the organizations 
takes all decisions by itself without interference from the ministry” (full autonomy). In the Swiss 
case the same scale was used but the respondent had to decide if this is true for three specific 
items (choice of target groups, choice of policy instruments, and prioritization of activities). In 
order to compare these two methods of measurement the responses in the Swiss case were 
brought back to a 7 point scale by adding up the answers and dividing them by 3. For all other 
cases exactly the same scales and formulations of the questions were used. 
We constructed the three autonomy dimensions as additive indices based on these items. In 
order to get an autonomy level between 0-100%, the new calculated variables have been 
scaled. It is important to stress that we can only measure the perceived autonomy.   
 
Independent Variables 
Because the paper wants to measure the impact the country and the legal form have on the 
autonomy we use these two potential determining factors as the main independent variables. 
Additional distinctive variables – as they are used in other studies – are the tasks the agencies 
perform, the age of the new legal from, the size (measured with the two subvariables annual 
budget and number of personnel), and if the agency has its own board.  
 
Discussion of Results 
The different legal forms and dimensions of autonomy are now correlated and compared for 
the Swiss and Austrian case. Graph 1 shows the autonomy for each legal type in Austria and 
Switzerland.   
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Graph 1: Average Autonomy of the Individual Legal Forms in Austria and Switzerland 
 
For a more precise analysis of the data for each autonomy dimension a two-way independent 
ANOVA (two independent variables measured using different groups) is conducted, using the 
countries, the legal types, the age of the legal framework, the performed tasks, the size, and the 
existence of a board as the independent variables (table 3). 
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 Policy Autonomy Financial Autonomy Operative HR 
Autonomy 
Strategic HR 
Autonomy 
Country - .190*** - .073** 
Legal Form .151*** .655*** .457*** .461*** 
Country and Legal 
Form 
- .114** .102** - 
Age (of legal 
framework) 
- - - - 
Tasks .118* - - - 
Budget Size - - - - 
Staff Size - - - - 
Board .104*** - - - 
The calculated value is the Eta Square of the ANOVA analysis (read: percentage of variance which is being explained 
by the single variable). Only significant correlations are being shown. 
***significant at 0.001 level; **significant at 0.01 level; *significant at 0.05 level; - not significant 
Table 3: ANOVA Results 
 
For the dimension of policy autonomy we can report the following effects: 
- Legal type 
There is a significant effect of the legal type on the level of policy autonomy. This shows 
that the different legal types perceive their policy autonomy differently. Our hypothesis 
1 is supported so far. 
- Country 
There is no significant main effect of the country on the policy autonomy, meaning that 
the organizations in Austria and Switzerland have more or less the same perception of 
policy autonomy. Additionally, we see that the legal type of the organizations influences 
the policy autonomy independently from the country the organization is based. 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
- Tasks and Board 
Policy autonomy is the only type of autonomy where we can observe a correlation with 
other variables. Whereas the age of the legal form, and the size of the organization have 
no significant impact, we see a correlation between tasks the agencies fulfill and the 
existence of a board.  
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For the dimension of financial autonomy we see the following effects: 
- Legal type 
There is a significant effect of the legal type on the level of policy. This shows that the 
different legal types perceive their financial autonomy differently. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported. 
- Country 
There is a significant main effect of the country on the policy autonomy, meaning that 
there is a difference in the perception of financial autonomy between Swiss and Austrian 
agencies. Swiss Agencies perceive their autonomy higher as Graph 1 shows. Hypothesis 2 
is supported. Additionally, the different legal types of agencies perceive their financial 
autonomy differently in Austria and Switzerland.  
 
For the dimension of strategic human resource autonomy we can report the following effects: 
- Legal type 
There is a significant effect of the legal type on the level of operational HR autonomy. 
This shows that the different legal types perceive their operational HR autonomy 
differently. Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
- Country 
There is a significant main effect of the country on the strategic human rosource 
autonomy, meaning that the organizations in Austria and Switzerland perceive the 
strategic HR autonomy differently. Swiss agencies perceive their strategic HR autonomy 
always significantly lower than their Austrian counterparts.  Hypothesis 2 is not 
supported. 
 
Last but not least, for the dimension of operative human resource autonomy we can observe 
the following effects: 
- Legal type 
There is a significant effect of the legal type on the level of strategic HR autonomy. This 
shows that the different legal types perceive their strategic HR autonomy differently. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
- Country 
There is no significant main effect of the country on the policy autonomy, meaning that 
there is no difference in the perception of strategic HR autonomy between Swiss and 
Austrian agencies. A correlation can be observed when analyzing the perception of each 
legal body between the countries. Swiss agencies of the individual legal forms perceive 
their strategic HR autonomy significantly lower as their Austrian counterparts. 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  
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As already mentioned, there is no significant correlation between the year the legal 
arrangement has been established, the size, the tasks, and the existence of a body on the 
various forms of autonomy. The only observable effect is the correlation between tasks, 
existence of a board, and the policy autonomy. This is caused by an autocorrelation because 
certain types of legal forms are being chosen for specific tasks and if you have legal forms of 
circle 3 and 4 institutions you often have boards.   
 
Conclusions 
Our study shows a strong evidence for hypothesis 1. The legal form seems to have a strong 
impact on all dimensions of autonomy. When the two countries change the legal form, they use 
this as an instrument to extend the autonomy of their agencies. The deeply-rooted law tradition 
of the two countries may be the main trigger for this finding.  
Hypothesis 2 and 3 must be declined. Switzerland and Austria show a very similar pattern of 
autonomy. We only find evidence for Hypothesis 2 when analyzing financial autonomy which is 
significantly higher in Switzerland than in Austria. A reason may be the stable financial 
Switzerland of the federal level of government. Additionally, the global budgeting was the main 
goal of NPM on the federal level in Switzerland. That is why the project was called “Steering 
with performance contracts and global budgeting (FLAG)”. This must have had a high impact on 
the financial autonomy.  
Switzerland and Austria are indeed twins of the Alps. Future research will have to focus on more 
variables and include Germany in order to get a complete view of autonomy perception in the 
German speaking countries. A weakness of this study is the grounding on the perceived 
autonomy. We should find ways to measure autonomy more precisely.  
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